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Commuting Death Sentences of the
Insane: A Solution for a Better,
More Compassionate Society
By LINDSAY A. HORSTMAN*
CLAUDE ERIC MATURANA is insane. He is a forty-four year old
French citizen, with chronic paranoid schizophrenia and is treated by
a psychiatrist every three weeks.1 These encounters with his doctor are
"filled with brief touches of reality overwhelmed by the bizarre."2
Claude Eric Maturana is also on death row.3 In 1992, he was con-
victed of first degree murder.4 Maturana and Stephen Ballard took
Glenn Estes, a teenager they believed stole a car part from them, into
the desert outside of Tucson, Arizona.5 Once in the desert, Maturana
and Ballard shot Estes several times and then slit his throat with a
machete. 6 The two defendants were tried separately.7 Maturana was
sentenced to death; Ballard received life imprisonment.8
Maturana's situation is legally significant because in 1986 the
United States Supreme Court, in Ford v. Wainwright,9 held that a per-
son sentenced to death cannot be executed if found "insane."10 Sup-
port for the 5-4 decision was based on the Eighth Amendment's "cruel
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1. See Carol Morello, "Healthy" would be a fatal diagnosis for prisoner, USA TODAY, Nov.
9, 1999, at 4A.
2. David Schwartz, Mentally Ill Inmate Poses Ethical Dilemma; Treatment Would Make His
Execution Possible, DALLAs MORNING NEWS, Aug. 9, 1999, at IA.
3. See Arizona v. Maturana, 882 P.2d 933, 934 (Ariz. 1994).
4. See id. at 935.
5. See id. at 934-35.
6. See id. at 934.
7. See id. at 935.
8. See id. at 935-36.
9. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
10. Id. at 401, 409-10.
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and unusual punishment" clause. 1 The Court however left the job of
implementing the standards for determining "competency to exe-
cute," to the respective states.12 Maturana's case did not address the
insanity issues presented in Ford, but the similarity of the facts and
circumstances of the two cases suggests that the Supreme Court has
not satisfactorily resolved the competency to execute standard, as
many seriously mentally ill persons are still being executed. 13
This Comment illustrates how the laws regarding the treatment
of the insane on death row dilute the spirit of Ford, and thus violate
the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.1 4 More specifically, this
Comment explores three main problems with the existing incompe-
tency laws. First, the competency to execute standard is too simplistic
in its definition of insanity. Currently an insane inmate can be put to
death if he is able to comprehend that being executed means that he
will die for a crime that he committed. The standard should be more
restrictive since extremely ill people are still able to meet this minimal
threshold requirement. Second, the procedures for determining com-
petency to execute are unreliable and inconsistent. Several factors
contribute to the procedural problems including when the sanity de-
termination is made, what preliminary showing is required, the lack of
uniformity amongst the states regarding evidence, and the amount of
discretion given to non-neutral parties. Finally, the remedy offered to
those found incompetent-restoring sanity through medication-is
contrary to evolving standards of decency. 15
11. Id. at 409-10. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[elxcessive bail shall not be required . . . nor cruel and unusual punishment in-
flicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
12. Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17.
13. For the purposes of this Comment, the author will not address the related but
different issue of executing the mental retarded. Currently about half of the death penalty
states allow the execution of the mentally retarded; however, the United States Supreme
Court is currently reviewing the constitutionality of this practice in Atkins v. Virginia, 534
S.E.2d 312 (Va. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 976 (2001). Until recently, it has not been
unconstitutional to execute the mentally retarded, as decided in Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S.
782 (2001).
14. See Roberta M. Harding, "Endgame:" Competency and the Execution of Condemned In-
mates-A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition Against the Infliction of Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 105, 108-09 (1994).
15. See Ptolemy H. Taylor, Execution of the "Artificially Competent". Cruel and Unusual?, 66
TUL. L. REv. 1045, 1059-60 (1992); see also Ford, 477 U.S. at 406. In addressing each of
these issues more closely, the author in no way attempts to overlook or diminish the nature
of the crimes involved, or the pain and suffering such crimes have caused the victims and
their families. Rather, the focus is the justness of our laws and the proper treatment of all
human beings.
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Part I of this Comment uses Maturana's case to highlight the
problems faced by insane death row inmates. Part II provides back-
ground information on the seminal United States Supreme Court
case, Ford v. Wainwright,16 and takes a close look at pertinent Califor-
nia law. This Comment proposes that a focused critique of California
law on the issue will enable California to prevent situations like
Maturana's from arising in its state. Part III lays out the flaws inherent
in the competency to execute standard, including the standard itself,
the procedures, and the consequences of its application. These flaws
show that the current system is inadequate and illustrate why a new,
uniform statute is necessary. Part IV presents a model statute, which
would require the automatic commutation of a death row inmate's
sentence to life imprisonment if found insane. Part IV also shows how
the model statute addresses the inadequacies of current statutes and
dispels some foreseeable concerns. This Comment urges that the stat-
ute be adopted in California, and that it be used as a model for other
states as well.
I. Current Problems with Executing the Insane: Arizona v.
Maturana
Maturana's situation is an illustrative example of a death row case
involving insanity issues. Before his original trial, Maturana's first law-
yer raised the issue of his client's mental competency, alleging that
Maturana had been "hearing voices and having hallucinations.' 17
Nonetheless, the trial court found him competent to stand trial. 18 The
issue of Maturana's sanity was not addressed again at trial nor was it at
issue when his case was on appeal before the Arizona Supreme
Court.19
After Maturana was sentenced to death, his new lawyer, Carla
Ryan, found records revealing a history of mental illness.20 She re-
quested a psychiatric evaluation in January 1999 and two doctors de-
clared Maturana incompetent.2 1 Ryan then "filed a motion that
16. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
17. Morello, supra note 1, at 4A.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See Kim Cobb, Arizona Seeks a "Hired Gun" to Treat Killer; Inmates Mental Illness Pits
Law Against Medical Ethics, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 25, 1999, at Al.
21. See Mentally Ill Man Awaits Execution, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL ONLINE (May 8, 2001),
at http://www.jsonline.com/news/nat/ap/mayO1 /ap-fit-to-dieO5O8O .asp [hereinafter
Mentally Ill Man Awaits Execution].
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resulted in a judge's declaration that Maturana was incompetent,"22
which resulted in Maturana being sent to a prison unit at the Arizona
State Mental Hospital in Phoenix.2 3
It is undisputed that due to the nature of schizophrenia, the
symptoms of the disease come and go. 24 However, some manifesta-
tions of Maturana's illness are as follows: Maturana thinks the CIA
comes and takes him to perform assassinations;25 he thinks the jail put
a device in him that allows him to talk to people telepathically;26 he is
convinced that he is an agent of the "world police" who monitor him
through a device in his chest;27 he speaks in numbers and initials;2 he
thinks his sentence has been commuted by "Rule 11, Margaret 3" and
that the "Embassy" and "NATO TOBY' divisions are involved;29 he be-
lieves he gets in and out of prison and conducts top secret investiga-
tions for the "Federal F&I" and "Central TBS;" 30 he stated he was the
world conductor in "American 601" and that he did not need medica-
tion because he has an "1107 working FBI 702."31 Other manifesta-
tions of his illness include frequently talking about visits from his
mother who has been dead for over thirty years, and hallucinations
that he is already dead.32 Maturana thinks that he is "going home
soon because he had gone through the American white flag check of
the badge No. 5071.3 and veterans' No. 620."33 Maturana has even
asked his attorney "why her office was not hooked up to the electronic
device inside him that allows him to communicate without a
telephone."3 4
22. Morello, supra note 1, at 4A.
23. See Mentally Ill Man Awaits Execution, supra note 21.
24. See Cobb, supra note 20, at Al. Schizophrenia is a disorder "marked by a tendency
to withdraw from reality, ambivalent, constricted, and inappropriate responses and mood,
unpredictable disturbances in stream of thought, regressive tendencies to the point of de-
terioration, and often hallucinations and delusions." BLAKISTON'S GouLD MEDICAL DIc-
TIONARY 1224 (McGraw-Hill 4th ed. 1979).
25. See Cobb, supra note 20, at Al.
26. See id. at Al.
27. Schwartz, supra note 2, at IA.
28. See Morello, supra note 1, at 4A.
29. Id. at 4A.
30. Susie Steckner, To Heal and Then Execute; Ethical Chasm Opens for Doctors in Case of
Schizophrenic Inmate, ARiz. REPUBLIC, July 7, 1999, at Al.
31. Id
32. See Mentally Ill Man Awaits Execution, supra note 21.
33. Emily Heller, Docs Refuse to Open Death's Door, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 1, 1999, at A5.
34. Id.
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Dr. Jerry Dennis, medical director and chief psychiatrist of Ari-
zona's State Mental Hospital, 35 is currently working with Maturana but
refuses to medicate him to the point of sanity for the sole purpose of
enabling the state to execute him.36 Maturana receives enough medi-
cation to keep him stable, but not enough medication to make him
"legally competent."3 7 Dr. Dennis could give Maturana two to three
times the current dosage of medication, but has stated that he would
only do so if Maturana were not condemned to death.3 8 Dr. Dennis
has stated "I'm upholding the ethics of my profession. It's not right to
give a patient treatment just so that he can be executed."39 He would
rather resign than make Maturana sane-in order for the state to
carry out his execution.40 Many doctors, including Dr. Dennis, believe
that such activity violates the Hippocratic Oath, 41 which governs the
practice of medicine.42 Dr. Jack Potts, chief forensic psychiatrist of
Maricopa County, refused a request to treat Maturana, stating "[i]t's
very clear it's an ethical violation . . . [o]ur role is do no harm. It
wasn't a hard call." 43
The prosecution is outraged by Dr. Dennis's position and is fight-
ing to have the imposed sentence carried out.44 The prosecutors have
articulated three main complaints. First, they disagree with Dr. Dennis
and others about the existence of an ethical conflict.45 The prosecu-
tor, Paul J. McMurdie, does not believe it is against a doctor's ethical
duties to medicate an inmate for the purpose of allowing the state to
35. See Lesley Stahl, 60 Minutes, Doctor's Dilemma; Whether a Prison Psychiatrist Who De-
dares a Murderer too Mentally Incompetent to be Executed can be Ordered to Improve his Condition so
That he Can be Executed (CBS NEws TRANSCRIPr, April 22, 2001) [hereinafter 60 Minutes].
36. See Amy Silverman, AG Napolitano Turns Down Her 60 Minutes of Fame, PHOENIX
NEw TIMES, March 15, 2001.
37. E.J. Montini, Being Sane Rxfor Death in Arizona, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Sept. 30, 1999, at
BI.
38. See David H. Schwartz, Doctors, Lawyers Clash Over Death-Row Case, THE CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 19, 1999, at 2.
39. Morello, supra note 1, at 4A.
40. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1A.
41. The Hippocratic Oath states in relevant part:
I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I
consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious
and mischievous. I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked . . . and will
abstain from every voluntary act of mischief and corruption.
U.S. Med. Students, Hippocratic Oath, available at http.//www.usmedstudents.com/links/
hippocraticoath.htm (visited Feb. 24, 2002).
42. See 60 Minutes, supra note 35.
43. Mentally Ill Man Awaits Execution, supra note 21.
44. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at IA.
45. See id.
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execute him.46 Second, McMurdie believes that Maturana and others
like him will do whatever it takes to be freed from death row even if it
requires blatant lying.47 McMurdie has stated that the claim for in-
competency is "the excuse of the month" for death row inmates.48
Finally, prosecutors have asserted that Dr. Dennis's prognosis is unre-
liable. 49 The prosecutors believe that any doctor could find some evi-
dence of a mental "problem" in every person on death row, and that
there is no way to distinguish the truly mentally ill from everyone
else.50 As representatives of the people, the prosecutors are outraged
at the thought that Maturana may not get what "he deserves"-that
which was legally imposed on him by ajury.51 "The state.., contends
that the law demands doctors at the state hospital to make every at-
tempt to restore Mr. Maturana to mental competency. "52
Despite Dr. Dennis's position, the hospital administrator, Jack Sil-
ver, tried to comply with the court's requirement to medicate
Maturana to the point of sanity in order for the state to carry out his
sentence, 53 but no doctor would step forward to do so. 54 No one in
the hospital would do it; no one in the state would do it; even a na-
tionwide search failed. 55 For many months, the Maturana controversy
and the battle between the legal and medical communities remained
at a virtual deadlock with no definitive resolution, with the opposing
sides staunchly defending their positions.
In January of 2000, Dr. Nelson C. Bennet came forward. 56 At the
time, Dr. Bennet was the medical director for Georgia inmates.5 7 Not
only did he agree to observe Maturana, 58 but found him to be "com-
46. See Heller, supra note 33, at A5.
47. See Cobb, supra note 20, at Al.
48. Schwartz, supra note 2, at IA.
49. See Steckner, supra note 30, at Al.
50. See id.
51. Schwartz, supra note 2, at IA.
52. Id.
53. See Morello, supra note 1, at 4A.
54. See Cobb, supra note 20, at Al.
55. See Morello, supra note 1, at 4A; see also Simon Davis, Insane Killer Treated so he Can
be Executed, Ruling on Death Row Schizophrenic is Condemned as Immoral, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
(LONDON), May 10, 2001, at 2 (stating "Arizona's attorney general [sent out] 1,400 letters
to psychologists across the United States trying to find someone who [would] treat
Maturana sufficiently for him to be executed.").
56. See Emily Heller, New Doc Deems Man Fit to Be Killed, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 24, 2000, at
A4.
57. See id. Dr. Bennett has since been hired by the Arizona State Mental Hospital. See
id.
58. He was paid $2,300 to interview Maturana. See 60 Minutes, supra note 35.
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petent to face death and [not in] need [of] the medication that has
been at the center of the dispute."5 9 Adding to this surprising diagno-
sis, Dr. Bennet admitted that although apparently competent for exe-
cution, Maturana was in fact seriously ill.60 His opinion resulted in
Maturana being moved back to death row where he remains today.61
He continues to receive medication, which is given to him "once a day
through a slot in the cell door."62 Maturana has been on and off death
row for over ten years, during which time his mental condition has
deteriorated considerably. 63 Maturana's attorney claims that "[t]here
is no way for me to communicate with him,"64 he has no concept of
reality,65 and he cannot assist in the defense of his case.66 Ironically,
since Maturana has not exhausted his appeals, no execution date has
been set.67
The governing Arizona statute states that a mentally incompetent
person may not be executed.68 The statute defines a mentally incom-
petent prisoner as one who is "presently unaware that he is to be pun-
ished for the crime of murder or unaware that the impending
punishment for that crime is death." 69 Inmates are allowed to file a
motion requesting a court order for a mental competency examina-
tion.70 The motion must be "timely and present[ ] reasonable
grounds for the requested examination."71 The court must then ap-
point experts to evaluate the inmate's mental state.72 "The experts'
reports shall indicate whether the prisoner suffers from a mental dis-
order, illness, defect or disability such that the prisoner is incompe-
tent to be executed and would benefit from competency restoration
treatment."73 After the examinations are complete, the court may con-
59. Heller, supra note 56, at A4.
60. See Alfred M. Freedman, M.D., The Doctor's Dilemma: A Conflict of Loyalties, 18 PSv-
CHIATRIC TIMES, ISSUE 1, Jan. 2001, at http://www.mhsource.com/pt/p010101b.html.
61. See Heller, supra note 56, at A4.
62. Schwartz, supra note 2, at IA.
63. See Arizona Prison Therapy, at http://www.patrickcrusade.org/aizona-prison-ther-
apy.htm (visited Feb. 1, 2002).
64. Patrice Bernard, A Frenchman on Death Row, LE JouRNAL Du DIMANCHE (Mar. 21,
1999) (copy on file with author).
65. See Mentally Ill Man Awaits Execution, supra note 21.
66. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at IA.
67. See Mike Wagner, Execution Debate to Continue, DAYrON DAILY NEWS, MAY 14, 2001,
at *2.
68. See Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4021 (A) (West 2000).
69. Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4021(B).
70. See Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4022(A) (West 2000).
71. Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4022(C).
72. See id.
73. Id.
Spring 2002]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
duct a hearing where the defendant must prove incompetence to be
executed by clear and convincing evidence.7 4 If found incompetent,
the inmate must receive competency restoration treatment and be-
comes eligible for death once competency is restored.75 Finally, while
the prisoner is being treated, the chief medical officer must file a re-
port with the superior court every sixty days regarding the prisoner's
competency.76
Maturana's situation is a prime example of the dilemma that
many death row inmates are facing. This case illustrates how the states
are inadequately dealing with mentally ill death row inmates, which
results in their execution and therefore directly violates the intent be-
hind the Supreme Court's decision in Ford. It is important that the
rules and procedures affecting insane death row inmates be assessed
and adjusted to make the system comport with the governing law.
H. Death Row and Insanity
A. Constitutional Constraints: Ford v. Wainwright 77
In 1986, in Ford v. Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court
held that it was unconstitutional to execute a death row inmate found
to be insane.78 Ford was sentenced to death in 1974, but in 1982 he
"began to manifest gradual changes in behavior" 79 and slowly fell into
mental illness. He had intricate theories about a conspiracy involving
the capture of family, friends, and national leaders.80 More specifi-
cally, Ford believed that he was part of a conspiracy within the prison
and that he had dealings with the Ku Klux Klan.81 Ford also believed
that his family members were being sexually assaulted somewhere
outside of the prison.82 A psychiatrist for the defense examined him
over a period of fourteen months, concluding in 1983 that Ford suf-
fered from "Paranoid Schizophrenia With Suicide Potential," which is
a "major mental disorder severe enough to substantially affect Mr.
74. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4022(E) & (F).
75. See generally ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4022 (H), 13-4023 (describing competency
restoration as giving an inmate treatment, such as anti-psychotic drugs or other similar
medication, in order to make the person sane. Once an inmate has been medicated to the
point where he can understand the fate that he is facing, his competency is restored.).
76. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4023(A) (West 2000).
77. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
78. See id. at 409-10.
79. Id. at 402.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
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Ford's ... ability to assist in the defense of his life."' 3 His doctor main-
tained that Ford did not know he was to be executed and that Ford
actually believed he could not be executed.8 4
Further investigation into Ford's sanity was conducted pursuant
to Florida law.8 5 Three doctors were ordered to evaluate Ford; each
doctor spent a total of only thirty minutes evaluating his sanity.8 6 Al-
though each prognosis was different, all three doctors determined
that he clearly had some type of mental illness.8 7 One doctor diag-
nosed him as suffering from psychosis with paranoia, another said he
was psychotic, and the final doctor concluded he had a severe adapta-
tional disorder.88 Nevertheless, each also determined he was able to
understand his fate.89 " [W] ithout explanation or statement, [the Gov-
ernor of Florida] .. .signed a death warrant for Ford's execution." 90
Ford's attorneys first sought relief from the state court to no avail,
after which they filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States
District Court, which was denied.91 The appellate court affirmed, but
the panel was divided. 92 The United States Supreme Court then
granted certiorari to decide whether executing the insane was uncon-
stitutional, and whether or not a competency hearing should be af-
forded to inmates.93
1. The Holding and Rationale
In Ford, the majority felt "compelled to conclude that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death
upon a prisoner who is insane."94 The majority found such conduct
violative of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment.95 The Court relied on historical reasoning to jus-
83. Id. at 402-03.
84. See id. at 403 (quoting Ford as stating: "I know there is some sort of death penalty,
but I'm free to go whenever I want because it would be illegal and the executioner would
be executed .... I can't be executed because of the landmark case. I won.").
85. See id. at 403-04; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. CH. § 922.07 (West 1985).
86. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 404.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 404-05.
93. See id. 405.
94. Id. at 409-10.
95. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 410; see also Kristen Wenstrup Crosby, Comment, State v.
Perry: Louisiana's Cure-to-Kill Scheme Forces Death-Row Inmates to Choose Between a Life Sentence
of Untreated Insanity and Execution, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1193, 1198-99 (1993).
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tify the rationales behind its decision, which commentators have
summarized as:
(1) the execution of the incompetent offends general notions of
humanity,[ 96 ] (2) execution of a madman does not successfully
achieve deterrence, [97] (3) an incompetent person cannot suffer
for committing the crime because of his inability to understand the
punishment, [98] (4) religious beliefs,[ 9 9] and (5) the belief that a
mentally ill person is punished for his madness alone.[ 0 0]
The holding was narrowly tailored to apply only to those persons on
death row who are found to be insane.1 0 ' A "competency to execute"
determination is usually done sometime before a scheduled execu-
tion, depending on the relevant state statute. 10 2
2. The Opinions
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Powell,
and Stevens, wrote the majority opinion of the Court and asserted
"that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from inflicting the
death penalty upon a prisoner who is insane.' 103 Beyond this central
holding, Ford was a plurality decision, in which the Justices split over
the necessary procedures and requirements for determining whether
a prisoner is insane.' 0 4
Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens criticized
Florida's statute, stating that the state's procedures provided an "inad-
equate assurance of accuracy." 0 5 justice Marshall reasoned that a con-
96. Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 35, 52-54 (1986). The execution of an insane person is "a miserable specta-
cle both against Law, and of extreme inhumanity and cruelty." Id. at 52.
97. See id. at 51.
98. The rule is based on retribution, which cannot be achieved if one does not under-
stand his fate. See id. at 54.
99. Id. Among other religious notions, "an insane person cannot make peace with
God." Id. at 50.
100. Rebecca A. Miller-Rice, The "Insane" Contradiction of Singleton v. Norris: Forced Med-
ication in a Death Row Inmates Medical Interest Which Happens to Facilitate His Execution, 22 U.
ARK. LIrTLE ROCK L. REv. 659, 662 (2000); see also Ford, 477 U.S. at 406-10. See generally
Harding, supra note 14, at 110-12 (discussing the "five rationales [that] have been histori-
cally relied upon to explain the creation and establishment" of the rule prohibiting execu-
tion of the insane).
101. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 410.
102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3700.5 (West 2000) (providing that "[wihenever a court
makes and causes to be entered an order appointing a day upon which a judgment of
death shall be executed upon a defendant, [then doctors will be appointed] to examine
the defendant, under the judgment of death, and investigate his or her sanity.").
103. Id. at 399-400.
104. See id. at 418 (Powell, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 400.
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demned prisoner should not be considered to have "lost the
protection of the Constitution altogether" simply because he is on
death row. 10 6 Justice Marshall argued that the main defects in the
Florida statute were: (1) the prisoner was not able to present material
evidence as to his sanity; (2) the defendant could not challenge the
state's psychiatrists; and (3) the ultimate decision rested entirely with
the Governor. 10 7 Justice Marshall asserted that the petitioner should
be afforded a de novo adversary hearing, allowing the inmate an oppor-
tunity to offer evidence on his behalf.108 However, the recommenda-
tion for a de novo adversary hearing did not gain majority support.10 9
Justice Powell, as previously mentioned, joined the majority opin-
ion as to the unconstitutionality of executing the insane under the
Eighth Amendment, but wrote a separate concurrence focusing on
the meaning of insanity and the procedures for reviewing a determi-
nation of insanity.110 Justice Powell defined the insane as "those who
are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they
are to suffer it."'111 Next, Justice Powell disputed Justice Marshall's re-
quirement for a de novo hearing and gave three reasons why it should
not be the standard. 12 First, the sanity determination would not de-
cide whether someone will be executed; rather, it settles when the exe-
cution will happen. 113 The state has an interest in seeing that those
persons duly tried and convicted are in fact brought to justice.1 14 Sec-
ond, the sanity hearing is not conducted "against a neutral back-
ground."1 15 In other words, sanity determinations are possible at any
stage in the process, and most defendants have already been found
competent at least once.1 16 Therefore, a state statute could "require a
substantial threshold showing of insanity merely to trigger the hearing
process"1 17 because of safeguards existing at the trial level." 8 Finally,
the determination of sanity is subjective, and a court hearing is not
106. Id. at 411.
107. See id. at 400.
108. See id. at 413-14.
109. See id. at 418 (Powell, J., concurring).
110. See id.
111. Id. at 422.
112. See id. at 425-26.
113. See id. at 425.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 426.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 420.
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the best venue in which to make such assessments.'1 9 Justice Powell
reiterated that "[d]ue process is a flexible concept, requiring only
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. '1 20
Justice O'Connor,joined by Justice White, concurred in part and
dissented in part, finding that no state should be required to hold a
full hearing on sanity.12 ' Justice O'Connor reasoned that the "de-
mands of due process are reduced" once one has been validly con-
victed and society has established its right to punish. 122 Justice
O'Connor further reasoned that the federal courts should stay out of
the issue altogether, as the imposition of the death penalty should be
left to the individual states.' 23
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented, argu-
ing that there should not even be an Eighth Amendment right pro-
tecting the insane from execution. 12 4 Justice Rehnquist viewed the
majority's opinion as one which "needlessly complicates and
postpones still further any finality in this area of law," and allows for
numerous unsubstantiated claims regarding a condemned man's san-
ity.125 In addition, the dissent also argued that the Florida statute was
acceptable and that the majority/plurality fabricated a problem and
then offered a solution inconsistent with precedent. 126
The splintered decision in Ford exemplified a core disagreement
within the Supreme Court about the imposition of the death penalty
on the insane. More specifically, the Court disagreed about what pro-
cedures should be used to determine sanity. The Court left the task of
implementing Ford's holding to the individual states, 127 which has re-
sulted in an inequitable application of the competency to execute
standard and divergent views over the "procedural safeguards that
must be provided to a condemned inmate who makes a claim of
mental incompetency."' 28
119. See id. at 426.
120. Id. at 425 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)).
121. See id. at 429. (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating "that this 'partic-
ular situation' warrants substantial caution before reading the Due Process Clause to man-
date anything like the full panoply of trial-type procedures").
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 433 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 435.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 406-10.
128. Sanford M. Pastroff, Eighth Amendment-The Constitutional Rights of the Insane On
Death Row, 77J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 844, 860 (1986).
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B. California Law
In post-Ford California, the law provides that once an execution
date has been set, three alienists129 from the medical staff of the De-
partment of Corrections are appointed to examine the inmate and
investigate his or her sanity. 130 If a prisoner is deemed insane, the
district attorney is notified, and jurors are summoned and impan-
eled.131 A hearing is then held, and if the person is found to be in-
sane, he is kept in confinement until his reason is restored.132 Then a
hearing is conducted in front of a judge who determines if sanity is in
fact regained.' 33 California's law is similar to many other states and
includes many of the same flaws typical in this area of law.
As far back as 1947, the Supreme Court of California addressed
some of the issues involved with the relevant death penalty statutes in
In re William Jerome Phyle.134 This case specifies the roles of each of the
different players involved in a competency determination. First, it is
the duty of the warden to call the need for a competency determina-
tion "to the attention of a district attorney for a judicial determina-
tion."135 Additionally, a judicial determination of sanity can occur
"only when the warden invokes such a proceeding.' 36 Second, resto-
ration of sanity is "a question for the determination of the superinten-
dent."' 3 7 Furthermore, "the Legislature has provided in effect that the
courts of this state are without power, except as provided by statute, to
determine the sanity of a person who has been sentenced to be exe-
cuted for a capital offense."' 38 Finally, the court in In re Phyle held that
there is no due process right to "an adjudication of the question of
[one's] sanity."' 39 This case exemplifies both the rigidity that exists in
California law and the inequitable assertions that the law rests upon.
The rigidity of the law is evident in the fact that the warden is the
person granted the power to start the process of reviewing a con-
demned man's sanity. The inequitable standards are apparent in the
129. An alienist is defined as "[a] psychiatrist. Especially, a physician qualified in a
court of law as an expert witness in the field of psychiatry." BLAKISTON'S GOULD MEDICAL
DICIONARY 47 (McGraw-Hill 4th ed. 1979).
130. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3700.5 (West 2000).
131. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3701 (West 2000).
132. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3703 (West 2000).
133. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3704 (West 2000).
134. 186 P.2d 134 (Cal. 1947).
135. Id. at 137.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 139.
139. Id.
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case's assertion that there is no inherent due process right to "adjudi-
cate" the issue of insanity. Although California's Penal Code autho-
rizes the impaneling of a jury for sanity determination, 140 case law
shows that this safeguard is not necessarily an adversary proceeding. 141
Another example of California precedence in this area is the case
of People v. Riley,142 which involved a condemned inmate whose mental
condition worsened as the day of his execution neared.143 The case
stands for the proposition that "in sanity determinations for death row
inmates, there is no absolute right to a hearing and the ruling of the
trial court was not subject to review by appeal."' 44 The defendant also
complained that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel in
the sanity hearing because his attorney was appointed only minutes
before the hearing.' 45 However, the court dismissed the complaint on
the basis that the appointed lawyer "acted zealously and
competently. 1 46
In re Phyle and Riley are illustrative of the application of California
law in executing the mentally ill. However, it should be noted that it is
difficult to specifically point to case law which sufficiently details all of
the difficulties arising in California, because the issue of competency
to execute does not always get addressed adequately on the appellate
record.
III. Problems with Implementing: "Competency to Execute"
There are four overarching problems with the current death pen-
alty law. First, the definition of insanity is too restrictive. The simple
manner in which states define competency to execute does not ac-
count for the complex nature of mental illness. Second, the current
"competency to execute" standards are inconsistent with the intent of
the Ford rule against execution of the insane. Third, the procedures
implemented by the states do not guarantee that the rights of an in-
sane inmate will be protected. Issues such as when sanity is deter-
mined, who determines it, and what evidence is required, in practice
do not ensure that the insane will not be executed. Fourth, the result
140. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3701 (West 2000).
141. See, e.g., People v. Riley, 235 P.2d 381, 381 (Cal. 1951).
142. See id.
143. See id. at 382.
144. Id. at 384.
145. See id. at 385.
146. Id.
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imposed-forced medication-when an inmate is determined to be
insane, does not serve any penal or societal interests.
A. Def'mitions
There are general, medical, and legal definitions of sanity, and
the differences among these definitions create many of the problems
that exist under death penalty statutes. Under current definitions, a
person may suffer from mental illness and be considered medically
insane but not legally insane or incompetent for the purpose of carry-
ing out the death penalty. This dichotomy results in the execution of
many medically ill persons.
Insanity is generally defined as "exhibiting unsoundness or disor-
der of mind.., to such a degree as to be unable to function safely and
competently in ordinary human relations." 147 Schizophrenia, a com-
mon form of insanity, is defined as:
A psychotic disorder ... characterized by disturbance in thinking
involving a distortion of the usual logical relations between ideas, a
separation between the intellect and the emotions so that the pa-
tient's feelings or their manifestations seem inappropriate to his
life situation, and a reduced tolerance for the stress of interper-
sonal relations. 14
8
Often, "the patient retreats from social intercourse into his own fan-
tasy life and commonly into delusions and hallucinations, and may...
go on to marked deterioration or regression in ... behavior." 149
The medical definition of insanity is:
A group of psychotic disorders .. .characterized by fundamental
alterations in concept formations, with misinterpretation of reality,
and associated affective, behavioral, and intellectual disturbances
in varying degrees and mixtures. These disorders are marked by a
tendency to withdraw from reality, ambivalent, constricted, and in-
appropriate responses and mood, unpredictable disturbances in
stream of thought, regressive tendencies to the point of deteriora-
tion, and often hallucinations and delusions. 150
However, insanity in legal medicine is defined as "a mental disor-
der of such severity that the individual (a) is unable to manage his or
her own affairs and fulfill social duties, (b) cannot distinguish right
from wrong, or (c) is dangerous to himself or others. '1 5 1
147. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 1167 (Merriam-Webster 3d ed.
1989).
148. Id. at 2030.
149. Id.
150. Bt.MSTON'S GOULD MEDICAL DIcrIONARY 1224 (McGraw-Hill 4th ed. 1979).
151. Id. at 681.
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There are many kinds of mental disorders. Personality disorders
are a type of mental illness which can make a person "rigid and mal-
adaptive, and damage social, interpersonal, and work relation-
ships";152 whereas "[p]aranoid personalities are characterized by
projection of [a person's] own conflicts and hostilities onto others.' 153
Comparatively, another disorder involves persons with "[a]ntisocial
personalities . . . [who] characteristically act out their conflicts and
flout normal rules of social order."154 Under medical definitions, a
person diagnosed as suffering from one of these or a combination of
these disorders will be deemed mentally ill. 1 55
In contrast, the legal definition of insanity is "[a] ny mental disor-
der severe enough that it prevents a person from having legal capacity
and excuses the person from criminal or civil responsibility." 156
All of the above definitions-general, medical, and legal-illus-
trate the vast complexities surrounding how a mental illness is defined
and diagnosed. Yet, when it comes to the execution of a condemned
person, the standard of sanity is viewed very differently. The legal defi-
nitions focus solely on the person's ability to understand the legal con-
sequences of his actions, instead of the complexities of the mental
illness from which the person suffers. The definition of legal insanity
should be expanded, so it encompasses a broader range of mental
illnesses and therefore prevents execution of all who are insane.
B. The Competency to Execute Standard
In order to be competent to execute, the condemned must be
aware that he is being punished for committing the crime of murder,
and aware that when the sentence is carried out, he will die.157 A per-
152. THE MERCK MANUAL 1545 (16th ed. 1992).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1546.
155. See BLAKiSTON'S GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 824 (McGraw-Hill 4th ed. 1979) (de-
fining mental illness or mental disorder as one of two psychiatric conditions, either pri-
mary brain function impairment or difficulty adapting to environment, "in which any
associated impairment of brain function is secondary to the psychiatric disturbance.").
156. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 797 (7th ed. 1999).
157. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4021 (B) (West 2000) (defining incompetency to
execute as being "presently unaware that he is be punished for the crime of murder or that
he is unaware that the impending punishment for that crime is death"); see also FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 922.07(1) (West 2001) (defining competency to execute as "whether he or she
understands the nature and effect of the death penalty and why it is imposed on him or
her").
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son who is found insane will have his sentence stayed until compe-
tency is regained. 158
The phrase "competent to execute" is used to define a person
who is sane for the purpose of carrying out the death penalty. 159 How-
ever, defining sanity as merely having the ability to understand one's
crime and fate does not account for the complexities involved with
diagnosis and treatment of mental illness. 160 Inevitability, with such a
low threshold that the state must meet, people who are actually suffer-
ing from mental illness are still being executed. 161 One defense attor-
ney described the standard as being "so low almost anyone who's
breathing can meet it."162
There are numerous examples of people who can be considered
insane under medical definitions but are still "competent to execute."
Such is the case of Ricky Ray Rector, who was executed in 1992 in
Arkansas. Rector shot himself in the head in a suicide attempt which
severed a three-inch section of his brain, and resulted in a "frontal
lobotomy."1 63 There is also Provenzano v. State,' 64 in which the defen-
dant was sentenced to death "despite his delusional belief that he
[was] Jesus Christ."' 65 For more than twenty years he believed he was
Jesus Christ and that he would be executed because he was Jesus
Christ.166 Thomas Provenzano was executed onJune 21, 2000.167 Each
158. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3703, 3704 (West 2000) (setting forth procedures
for suspension of execution and commitment to a state mental facility).
159. See Rochelle Graff Salguero, Medical Ethics and Competency to be Executed, 96 YALE L.
J. 167 (1986).
160. See, e.g., Laura Reider, Toward a New Test for the Insanity Defense: Incorporating the
Discoveries of Neuroscience into Moral and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. REv. 289, 332-33 (1998)
(addressing the oversimplification of mental diseases:
While it is easy and, at times, administratively efficient to classify individuals into
general categories of illnesses, it is not necessarily just .... The interaction be-
tween the brain and the body is too complex-and our ability to diagnose accu-
rately is too unsophisticated-to exclude individuals based upon layperson's
generalizations.)
161. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 96, at 58 (stating "some individuals are clearly incompe-
tent, but many more are marginally competent; that is, competent to make some decisions
or to take responsibility for some actions, but not others").
162. Spencer Hunt, Sanity Standards: Mentally Ill Inmates Executed, CINCINNATi ENQUIRER
(April 22, 2001) (quoting Timothy F. Sweeney, attorney for Jay D. Scott in State v. Scott,
497 N.E.2d 55 (Ohio 1986), and Scott v. Anderson, 58 F.2d Supp. 767 (N.D. Ohio 1998)).
163. Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239, 1240 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting to denial of
certiorari).
164. 760 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2000).
165. Id. at 140.
166. See id. at 141 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
167. See Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in the U.S. 2000, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicexecOO.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2002).
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of these individuals could be considered insane, and it is hard to be-
lieve that they actually met the competency to execute standard.
After their respective convictions, both Ford and Maturana were
diagnosed as schizophrenic. The complexities involved in their
mental illnesses vary, yet the competency to execute standard fails to
address these differences. 168 The standard of understanding the fate
of death reduces a sanity determination to a simplistic evaluation that
does not address the concern of society, which as stated in Ford, is
preventing the execution of the insane. 169 Not only has this prohibi-
tion been a part of American history, but contemporary values of a
maturing society should play a role in determining punishments that
comport with fundamental human dignity.1 70 Yet, under current state
laws, most death row inmates are found competent enough to be exe-
cuted regardless of their mental disabilities. 171
C. Procedures for Determining Competency to Execute
Problems also exist with the differing state statutes that govern
the execution of the mentally ill, which further aggravates the ability
of insane death row inmates to receive justice in post conviction pro-
ceedings. The more pressing problems regarding the competency to
execute procedures include: when the issue of insanity is ripe; the re-
quirements to receive an insanity hearing; the lack of uniformity
among jurisdictions regarding the standard of proof necessary to
prove insanity; and the amount of discretion given to governors.
1. Ripeness
Although the amount of time an inmate will spend on death row
varies from state to state, an inmate can expect to spend an average of
ten years on death row. 172 Even though the number of years spent on
death row seems long, there are many timing issues that affect death
row inmates. One problem with the existing laws in several states, in-
168. Inmates often have suffered from "perinatal complications, developmental disabil-
ities, childhood abuse and neglect, brain damage, social ostracism, failure in school and
work, drug and alcohol abuse, or multiple suicide attempts." David Lovell & Ron Jemelka,
Coping With Mental Illness in Prisons, FAM. AND COMMUNITY HEALTH, No. 3, Vol. 21, at 54
(1998).
169. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10.
170. See id. at 406.
171. See Heller, supra note 33, at A5 (paraphrasing Stephen B. Bright, a death penalty
opponent who teaches competency at Yale Law School).
172. See Elizabeth Rapaport, Equality of the Damned: The Execution of Women on the Cusp of
the 21st Century, 26 OHio N. U. L. Rev. 581, 583 (2000).
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cluding California, is that the issue of sanity is not ripe for a court to
hear until death is imminent. 173 In such states, a competency to exe-
cute determination is not made until an execution date is set and is
often conducted only after the court has issued an execution war-
rant.1 74 While being condemned strips a person of many rights, cer-
tain basic fundamental rights afforded by the Constitution remain.
175
Therefore it follows that before one's life can be taken, basic due pro-
cess requirements must be satisfied at all stages of the trial and ap-
peals. One way to satisfy due process requirements is to create
adequate time frames to ensure effective representation by counsel.
Yet, it seems that the current practice in the United States is to deal
with the death penalty in an increasingly rapid manner, as a means of
achieving administrative efficiency. 176 This leaves the inmate with lit-
tle opportunity to adequately prove his incompetency. Rushing the
process may increase unreliability in the determination of sanity, be-
cause time constraints leave the client and his attorney with fewer op-
tions to pursue and less time to gather evidence and information. The
need for administrative necessity should not be a compelling enough
state interest, especially when weighed against the fundamental right
to life. 1 77 Often with death row inmates, however, this notion gets dis-
torted. Therefore, it is necessary to change the current laws so that the
issue of mental competency is ripe at any stage during the proceed-
ings. This change will allow condemned inmates sufficient opportu-
nity to raise pertinent insanity issues.
2. Preliminary Showing of Insanity
Many jurisdictions require a preliminary showing of insanity
before a court will grant a sanity hearing.1 78 This requirement is prob-
173. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3700.5 (providing that "[w]henever a court makes and
causes to be entered an order appointing a day upon which a judgment of death shall be
executed upon a defendant, [then doctors will be appointed] to examine the defendant,
under the judgment of death, and investigate his or her sanity"). See a/so Van Tran v. State,
6 S.W.3d 257, 267 (Tenn. 1999) (noting that Tennessee only allows three days to file a
petition for incompetency); Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
174. See People v. Kelly, 822 P.2d 385, 413 n. 11 (Cal. 1992) (stating "defendant's sanity
for execution is not now at issue since an execution date has not even been set").
175. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 411.
176. See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253, 2244
(2001) (providing that "[a] [one] year period of limitation shall apply to an application for
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court").
177. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (protecting individuals from being denied "life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law").
178. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-111(1) (2001) (providing that "[w]henever the ques-
tion of a defendant's incompetency to proceed is raised, the court shall make a preliminary
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lematic because it requires the inmate to show evidence of insanity to
get a hearing, when the purpose of a hearing is to give the inmate an
opportunity to prove his insanity to the court. 179 For example, in
Georgia there is a presumption of sanity if the inmate already re-
quested and received a prior sanity hearing at which he was found
competent, the defendant is then required to make a prima facie
showing of a substantial change in circumstances to again raise the
issue of competency.180 Even more restrictive are the laws of Idaho
and Illinois, which only allow one opportunity to bring challenges to
the sentence of death. 181 In Martin v. State,182 the defendant's motion
for a hearing was denied because "the nature of Martin's mental con-
dition is basically the same as was presented and rejected at pre-trial
finding either that the defendant is competent to proceed or that the defendant is not.");
KAN. STAT. ANN. §22-4006 (Supp. 2001) (dictating that the judge will suspend the sentence
and conduct a hearing to determine sanity only if there is reason to believe that the convict
is insane);Johnson v. State, 508 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Mo. 1987) (holding that the defendant
failed to establish reasonable probability that he was presently insane solely upon reading
his affidavits); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2949.28 (Anderson 1999) (requiring the judge to
determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the convict is insane, then hold a
hearing); Commonwealth v. Moon, 117 A.2d 96,98 (Pa. 1955) (stating that without a hear-
ing, the court appointed a sanity commission and defendant was found to be insane. "[I]t
is the court and not the commission which must be satisfied that appellant is mentally ill
under the standard prescribed." Defendant was deemed sane by the trial court because he
knew where he was, what his sentence was, and why.); Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257, 269
(Tenn. 1999) (putting "the burden on the prisoner to make a threshold showing that he or
she is presently incompetent"); Ex parteJeffrey Henry Caldwell, 58 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. 2000)
(holding that the defendant "did not make a substantial showing of incompetence [and]
... therefore was not entitled to the appointment of experts or a competency hearing");
State v. Harris, 789 P.2d 60, 68 (Wash. 1990) (one procedure of determining the mental
state of a condemned prisoner is a "preliminary substantial showing of incompetency");
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-902 (Michie 2001) (If there is reasonable cause to believe that a
defendant does not have the requisite mental capacity, the court shall order a stay of
execution.).
179. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 411 (stating that "in addition to providing a court judgment
on the constitutional question, the State must also ensure that its procedures are adequate
for the purpose of finding the facts").
180. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-69 (Michie 1997) (providing that if a person has previ-
ously applied and has been determined competent to be executed, then there is a pre-
sumption of sanity, and the defendant must make a prima facie showing of a substantial
change in circumstances in order to re-raise the issue of competency).
181. See Paz v. State, 852 P.2d 1355, 1356 (Idaho 1993) The statute
provides a defendant one opportunity to raise all challenges to the conviction and
sentence in a petition for post-conviction relief except in those unusual cases
where it can be demonstrated that the issues raised were not known and reasona-
bly could not have been known within the time frame allowed by the statute.
Id. See also People v. Jones, 730 N.E.2d 26, 28 (Ill. 2000) ("The Post-Conviction Hearing Act
contemplates the filing of only one post conviction petition.").
182. 515 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1987).
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on the issue of competency to stand trial."183 The jurisdictions that
prevent multiple sanity determinations are ignoring not only the in-
herent unpredictability of mental illness itself (because symptoms
come and go and may develop over time), but also that being on
death row can enhance or create insanity.184 Studies have shown that
condemned inmates suffer psychological deterioration on death row,
and most often this deterioration comes from "the unique stress of
anticipating one's death at a known time and in a predesignated man-
ner."18 5 Given the unique circumstances involved in determining the
existence of mental illness, once an inmate is found insane, the death
sentence should be commuted. 186
In Ford, Justice Powell argued that a state may require a "substan-
tial threshold showing of insanity" to trigger a sanity hearing because
most defendants had a sanity determination made during their origi-
nal trial.187 However, this requirement ignores the fact that inmates
requesting a sanity determination may not have had their competency
to stand trial previously reviewed. 188 It also ignores the fact that very
few defendants are found incompetent to stand trial.18 9 Additionally,
the standards for incompetency at the trial or appellate level is differ-
ent from the standards before execution. For example, in California
the applicable law was recently articulated in People v. Jones.190 There
the court stated, "[a] defendant who, as a result of mental disorder or
developmental disability, is unable to understand the nature of the
criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense
in a rational manner is incompetent to stand trial."191 This standard is
actually higher than competency to execute. Compare with the case of
State v. Steelman,19 2 in which nine psychiatrists agreed that the defen-
dant was suffering from some form of severe mental illness, with most
183. Id. at 190.
184. See Salguero, supra note 159, at 172. The imposition of a capital sentence on a
person, combined with the conditions on death row, repeatedly leads to a development of
psychiatric illness in inmates. See id.
185. Id. See also Taylor, supra note 15, at 1049 (stating that "[o]ne of the least common
and possibly the most stressful of all human experiences is the anticipation of death at a
specific moment in time and in a known manner").
186. See Harding, supra note 14, at 137-39.
187. Ford, 477 U.S. at 425-26 (Powell, J., concurring).
188. See Death Penalty Information Center, Death Row USA, State Lists of Prisoners on
Death Row as ofJuly 1, 2001, at http://wwww.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DRUSA-TX.html (visited
Feb. 22, 2002).
189. See id.
190. 811 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1991).
191. Id. at 780 (citations omitted).
192. 612 P.2d 475 (Ariz. 1980).
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agreeing it was paranoid schizophrenia. 193 One doctor stated that the
defendant had a "mental illness impairing mental process to a disa-
bling degree." 94 The defendant was still sentenced to death because
the mitigating circumstances of his illness did not outweigh the aggra-
vating circumstances of the crime committed. 195 Also consider Colburn
v. State,'96 in which the defendant had an extensive history of para-
noid schizophrenia, but was nevertheless tried, convicted, and sen-
tenced to death.' 97 The court held that the "fact that appellant had a
mental illness when he was tried and sentenced is not determinative
of whether he will be sane at the moment of his execution."' 98 Col-
burn is still on death row in Texas.' 99 Next, in Illinois, the Post Con-
viction Hearing Act "does not authorize a court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether a post-conviction petitioner
is mentally fit to assist post-conviction counsel." 200
These examples demonstrate that many of the sanity determina-
tions made during or before trial are as ineffective as those made di-
rectly before execution.
3. Lack of Uniformity Regarding Evidence
Another problem with the sanity determination is the lack of uni-
formity among the states as to what evidence of insanity must be
shown in order to obtain post-conviction relief. For example, some
states require proof by clear and convincing evidence. 20' Other states,
however, require a preponderance of the evidence. 20 2 Illustrative of
this problem is Alabama's statute, which leaves the sanity determina-
193. See id. at 483.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. 966 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
197. See id. at 513.
198. Id.
199. See NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Quarterly Report by the
Criminal Justice Project, Death Row U.S.A., Fall 2001, available at http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/DRUSA-TX.html.
200. People v. Owens, 564 N.E.2d 1184, 1186 (Il1. 1990).
201. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4023 (West 2000); see also Medina v. State, 690 So.
2d 1241, 1247 (Fla. 1997); IDAHO CODE § 19-2523(2) (Michie 2000) (providing that the
judge will authorize that the defendant receive treatment if it is concluded by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant is ill, the illness will lead to deterioration of the
defendant, treatment is available, and a reasonable person would agree to medication).
202. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-111(2) (2001) (providing that "the burden of submitting
evidence and the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence are upon the party
asserting the incompetency of the defendant."); see also Ky. REv. STAT. § 431.2135 (West
1998); Billot v. State, 655 So. 2d 1, 14-15 (Miss. 1995) (finding that a hearing will be held
to determine sanity by a preponderance of the evidence, which may be appealed).
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tion to the judge's "unbridled discretion";20 3 while in Texas there is
no standard for the court to follow in determining competency to be
executed.204 Without a uniform standard for defendants to attempt to
achieve, or for judges to apply and be held to, there are risks that
severely mentally ill patients may be treated differently depending
upon the jurisdiction in which the crime was committed and possibly
be denied the ability to prove their insanity.
4. Governor Discretion
Finally, the amount of discretion given to state governors in mak-
ing the final sanity determination poses another problem.205 Each
state differs in the amount of authority given to the governor, but it is
inequitable to give the governor sole, unreviewable power in a deter-
mination of this magnitude. First, governors are not neutral by virtue
of their elected position nor are they qualified to determine the issue
of sanity.20 6 For example, in Rector v. Clinton,20 7 discussed previously,
the inmate suffered from a brain injury because "he shot himself in
the head shortly after committing the murder for which he received
203. See Magwood v. Smith, 791 F. 2d 1438, 1445-46 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that the
defendant had no idea what evidence was necessary to satisfy the requirement of the
statute).
204. See Ex parteJordan, 758 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tex. 1988) (the court urged the legisla-
ture to adopt legislation on the issue).
205. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-90-506 (Michie Supp. 2001) (if a person is found incom-
petent, the governor shall order that appropriate mental health treatment be provided);
FLA. STAT. ANN § 922.07 (West 2001) ("When the Governor is informed that a person
under sentence of death may be insane, the Governor shall stay execution of the sentence
and appoint a commission of three psychiatrists to examine the convicted person." If
found insane the Governor will commit the person to a health treatment facility until he or
she regains sanity.); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431.240 (Banks-Baldwin 2001) (the execution
will not take place until the Governor warrants it unless stayed by due process of law); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 552.060 (West Supp. 2001) (the director of the department of corrections
shall notify the governor if there is concern that a condemned person may be insane, and
the governor shall order a stay of execution if necessary and there is enough time after
notification for a determination); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 23A-27A22, 24 (Michie 1999)
(when a death row defendant is mentally incompetent the warden shall notify the Gover-
nor and he shall appoint a commission of three to five disinterested, licensed physicians to
examine him. When a defendant is incompetent to proceed the Governor shall suspend
the sentence. The Governor can have him transferred to the human services center or
not.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-8 (1999) (the Governor or the Board of Pardons and Pa-
role or the executive director of the Department of Corrections may suspend the execu-
tion of a judgment of death in cases of suspected incompetency, however the executive
director only has the power to stay the execution temporarily).
206. See Pastroff, supra note 128, at 862 (advocating that "the decision maker should
not be the governor because of his potential bias").
207. 823 S.W.2d 829 (Ark. 1992).
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the death penalty."208 Despite the fact that Rector was missing part of
his brain, the court refused to deem Rector insane. 20 9 The court in-
stead stated: "[A] Ithough we may reduce a death sentence to life with-
out parole, and have done so in the past, that action is taken as a
matter of law, not as an act of clemency."210 The court then deter-
mined that the decision to grant clemency rests with the executive
branch, which did nothing, and Rector was eventually executed. 211
In order to avoid this problem, the sanity determination should
only be decided by a medical doctor. Additionally, once the determi-
nation has been made, it must be reviewed by a neutral fact finder, in
order to avoid the possibility of bias or political influence.
D. The Consequences of a Determination of Incompetency
For Maturana the situation is simple, there are only two options.
Either he may live on death row forever, victim to a very debilitating
mental illness, and therefore avoid execution, or he may be medi-
cated with drugs that will relieve his suffering, but make him tempora-
rily "sane," enabling the state to put him to death. These are the only
options since the law clearly states if a person is actually found "incom-
petent to be executed," the result is only the postponement of
death.21 2 As Justice Powell explained in Ford, the determination is not
whether the person should be executed, but when.213
As currently written, many state laws require automatic medica-
tion of inmates found to be insane. 214 The practice of medicating, also
known as artificial sanity, only recently became controversial when
Maturana's doctor would not medicate him.2 15 The problem with this
practice is two-fold. First, the law provides that the insane shall not be
executed because it is cruel and unusual punishment.21 6 Artificial san-
ity is not a substitute for true sanity. Drugs inherently have only a tem-
porary effect on people, usually just as long as the drug is in the blood
208. Id. at 830.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 830.
211. See id. at 831.
212. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 425.
213. See id.
214. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4022(H) (West 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3703
(West 2000).
215. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at IA; see also Steckner, supra note 30, at Al.
216. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10.
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stream. 217 Additionally, "[t]he temporary nature of chemical compe-
tence renders difficult a reliable assessment of the sufficiency of an
inmate's competence for execution." 218 Since an insane inmate can-
not truly be made permanently sane, it follows that the inmate cannot
be made competent to be executed, as the Supreme Court intended.
Second, "medication of death-row inmates to produce competency for
execution is merely an attempt to circumvent the national consensus
against execution of the insane-a consensus that clearly does ex-
ist."219 We must have laws that comport with "the evolving standards of
decency of our society that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety."2 2 0 However, obtaining artificial sanity through mandatory drug-
ging, which is often unwanted, is contrary to these values.
Inconsistency in the treatment of death-eligible prisoners poses a
problem, specifically in the area of forced medication. For example,
Arkansas and Louisiana came to opposite conclusions in deciding
whether forced medication should be used in order to gain compe-
tency to be executed.221 Arkansas found that forcibly medicating an
inmate for the purpose of execution was justified.222 The court specifi-
cally relied "on the state's expressed intention for forcing the medica-
tion, for [the inmate's] 'own good' and the institution's, as contrasted
with any intention to make him competent to be executed."223 On the
other hand, the Louisiana court found that drugging solely for the
purpose of execution could not be construed as medical treatment
and therefore could not be condoned. 224
The decision by the two state courts presents an ethical dilemma
for physicians over whether to medicate prisoners to the point of gain-
ing competency for the sole purpose of allowing the state to impose
death. 225 This dilemma pits the medical community against the law,
spawning extensive debate. 226 The Current Opinions of the Council
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs ("CEJA") specifically provide that
217. SeeTaylor, supra note 15, at 1059 (citing DonaldJ. Kemma, Current Status ofInstitu-
tional Mental Health Patient's Right to Refuse Pschotropic Drugs, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 107, 110
(1985)).
218. Crosby, supra note 95, at 1204.
219. Taylor, supra note 15, at 1065.
220. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
221. See Singleton v. Norris, 992 S.W.2d 768 (Ark. 1999); see also State v. Perry, 502 So.
2d 543, 563-64 (La. 1986).
222. See Singleton, 992 S.W.2d at 770.
223. Id. at 768.
224. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 752-56 (La. 1992).
225. See Miller-Rice, supra note 100, at 670.
226. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at IA.
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"[p] hysicians should not determine legal competence to be executed.
When a condemned prisoner has been declared incompetent to be
executed, physicians should not treat the prisoner for the purpose of
restoring competence unless a commutation order is issued before
treatment begins."227 The American Medical Association ("AMA")
policy is: "[I] f treatment is primarily directed to restore competency to
be executed, it is ethically unacceptable." 228 The AMA guidelines also
state: "[A] physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to pre-
serving life when there is hope of doing so, should not be a partici-
pant in a legally authorized execution." 229 Additionally, in 1996, the
World Psychiatric Association "specifically prohibited its members...
from engaging in determinations of competency of death row inmates
to be executed." 230 Moreover, it was stated that "[u] nder no circum-
stances should psychiatrists participate in legally authorized execu-
tions nor participate in assessments of competency to be executed."23'
"Medical professionals [have] said anyone who takes on the job could
face the loss of license to practice."232
On the other side of the debate is the prosecution and the law. In
Arizona, prosecutors have threatened to file contempt charges against
the State's Mental Hospital administrators because their refusal to
medicate Maturana is in violation of their duty to treat the prison-
ers.23 3 However, filing contempt of court charges could force medical
ethics and the law to meet head to head in a conflict that may not
result in the best resolution for society. In other words, if doctors are
forced to comply with medicating to execute, whether or not the doc-
tor believes it should be required, the legal world would be imposing
rules onto the medical field even though the profession has its own
rules and guidelines. Thus the problem turns into a battle of conflict-
ing established norms, between separate and distinct professional
227. AMA Policy Finder-Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Af-
fairs (CEJA) E-2.06 Capital Punishment, available at http:www.ama0assn.org/apps/pfon-
line?f n=browse&doc=policyfiles/CEJA/E-2.0 (last visited Feb. 4, 2002).
228. Schwartz, supra note 2.
229. Cobb, supra note 20, at Al.
230. Abraham L. Halpern, M.D., When Physicians Participate in Capital Punishment, May
7, 1999, available at http://www.psych.org/pnews/99-05-07/halpern.html.
231. Id.
232. Id. These rules pose an additional problem since this Comment asserts that only
medical doctors should determine whether an inmate is competent to be executed. How-
ever, if the model statute, infra, is adopted, the participation of the physician would not
violate rules of medical ethics because they would not be assisting or furthering the death
of any person.
233. See Morello, supra note 1, at 4A.
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bodies. Thus, "[there is] a rare clash over how far states should go in
carrying out a punishment that itself has always been the subject of
great moral debate."23 4 Maturana's case has brought these divergent
viewpoints into conflict. Maturana's lawyer and doctors are advocating
for a change in Arizona law.235 This may be the only solution that
could provide a true and meaningful remedy to a problem that is in
dire need of a cure.
IV. Model Statute
With all the considerations discussed above, this Comment pro-
poses a model statue to resolve the problems with the current treat-
ment of death row inmates suffering from mental illness, as well as
collateral tensions and issues. In urging adoption of the model statute
in California and throughout the United States, this Comment also
addresses concerns that may arise in connection with implementing
the statute.
"The Human Rights Advocacy Committee ... recommended that
before hospital staff be required to treat the incompetent con-
demned, the sentence be commuted to life imprisonment; staff treat-
ment thus would not advance the patient toward execution. '236 The
following is a model statute, which seeks to implement the changes
suggested by the Human Rights Advocacy Committee, and that this
Comment urges California and other states to adopt, to ensure that
incompetent inmates are not executed:
Any time a condemned inmate wishes to have his sanity evaluated,
he is entitled to an attorney and a full hearing. Incompetence is
that which is any major disconnect with reality or severe mental
illness. The inmate will be evaluated by a doctor of his choice. If
the defendant is found to be incompetent, the judge will order his
sentence commuted to life imprisonment. After the sentence is
commuted the prisoner is to be removed from death row and
treated for his insanity. Should the court find that the defendant is
sane, the defendant will be allowed an appeal as of right and will
not be barred from subsequent requests prior to execution. 23 7
234. Schwartz, supra note 38.
235. See Steckner, supra note 30, at Al.
236. Salguero, supra note 159, at 179-80.
237. To clarify, the author notes that the language of the proposed model statute is her
own.
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A. Implementation of the Statute
The proposed statute is geared toward protecting the rights of
the condemned, and instituting the kind of justice upon which our
legal system is founded. Unlike some current state statues, this model
statute allows for sanity determinations before death is imminent. It
also allows for a full evidentiary hearing, similar to the type thatJustice
Marshall advocated for many years ago in Ford.23 8 The statute rede-
fines "competency to execute" in order to account for the many differ-
ent types of mental illness that exist, and in doing so will hopefully
save those who are truly insane from execution. It offers a solution
that is more compatible with a compassionate society and with treat-
ment of ill human beings. Lastly, it does not prevent requests for a
rehearing, if such requests are found necessary.
Application of this proposed law to Maturana's case exemplifies
the need for such a statute. If Maturana were evaluated under the new
competency to execute standard, he would be found insane and thus
able to receive treatment that would actually help improve his mental
condition. He would still be incarcerated in a prison hospital but he
would not be eligible for execution or be on death row. In addition,
the statute adds a provision that California and other states are lack-
ing-that inmates be evaluated by a doctor of their choice. This provi-
sion will ensure that inmates are given fair evaluations, which should
result in unbiased results. 23 9 In Maturana's case, had he been found
sane, he would still have the opportunity to re-petition the court for a
sanity hearing should his condition worsen.
Part of the reasoning behind the rule in Ford was to protect peo-
ple from the fear and pain of death without the comfort of under-
standing 240 and because the execution of "a mad man is . . . a
miserable spectacle, both against Law, and of extre[me] inhumanity
and cruelty, and can be no example to others."2 41 These same reasons
also apply to this newly proposed statute. Those who are undoubtedly
mentally ill, but pass the simple "understanding one's fate" test, may
still not have an adequate grasp on reality, and the world, rendering
execution unjust.
238. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 418.
239. See, e.g., James J. Gobert, In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. CiuM. L. & CRIMINOL-
ony, 269, 287 (1988) (stating it is "the selection of impartial jurors which insures nondis-
criminatory decision making").
240. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 410.
241. Id. at 407 (quoting Sir Edward Coke, 3 INSTITUTES 6 (6th ed. 1680)).
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B. Concerns
The fears which may arise in response to the model statute are
threefold. First, if California or another state were to adopt the model
statute, there may be an increase in instances of malingering.2 42 Al-
though this is an understandable worry, physicians who review sanity
issues are capable of detecting the differences between real and fake
mental illnesses.2 43 Refusing to provide inmates with adequate proce-
dures for fear that one could abuse the system does not comport with
society's view of fairness, and it unjustly punishes those who are truly
in need of protection.
A second concern is that the courts may become overloaded with
hearings as a result of implementing a more liberal statute, such as the
one proposed by the model statute.244 This argument can be brought
any time a change to the penal system is recommended or suggested,
however should not prohibit important changes. Additionally, the de-
termination of sanity is a matter of life or death. When such important
decisions are at hand, the law should not diminish defendants' rights
because of clerical and systematic inconveniences. This argument
does not serve the interests ofjustice nor does it seek to find the truth,
both of which are important notions in American jurisprudence.
Finally, some people may feel that justice is being subverted by
allowing inmates to evade the sentence that was imposed under the
system of law by which we all must abide.2 45 However, this argument
ignores the fact that insane inmates need help and protection. It is
because of these differences and the fact that our society, through its
laws, needs to act with compassion, that the United State Supreme
Court held that the insane shall not be executed.246 However, under
current statutes, our society cannot ensure that the law is being up-
held because of the lack of uniformity and inherent inequalities in the
system of review. The only way to ensure that Ford is upheld is to have
242. See BLAKISTON'S GOULD MEDICAL DIcrIONARY 797 (McGraw-Hill 4th ed. 1979) (de-
fining a malingering as "feign [ing] or exaggerat[ing] illness or incapacity in order to avoid
work or other responsibilities").
243. See Harding, supra note 14, at 142-43.
244. See Karl Manheim, The Business of the California Supreme Court: A Comparative Study,
26 Loy. LA. L. REv. 1085, 1108 (1993) (noting that the "the court transacts nearly ten
thousand items of business each year. These consist principally of petitions for hearing,
orders[,] and case depositions."). The author also noted that there has been a "crush of
death penalty appeals." Id. at 1129.
245. See David Mc Cord, Imagining a Retributivist Alternative to Capital Punishment, 50 FLA.
L. REv. 1, 28-34 (1998).
246. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10.
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better, more uniform standards, and commute the sentences of those
who are indeed found to be insane.
Conclusion
"[T]he Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the in-
fliction of uncivilized and inhumane punishments. The State, even as
it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic
worth as human beings. '247 The clause must also "be read with an eye
toward evolving standards of decency and in the light of contempo-
rary human knowledge." 248 The law as it now stands is unjust. It ques-
tions the ethics and morality of the criminal justice system; it causes a
conflict between medical and legal standards; and it does not offer
insane inmates the protection and treatment they are entitled to.
Claude Maturana deserves to be punished for the crime that he
committed. But the problems with Maturana's case are a sign that the
current system is ripe for change. California and other states should
adopt a standard that provides fair treatment for every human being
and commutes the death sentences of the mentally insane, and thus
comports with the United States Constitution.
247. Taylor, supra note 15, at 1047 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 237, 270
(1972)).
248. Crosby, supra note 95, at 1197 (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666
(1962)).
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